Dynamics of an economic model of the electric power duopoly game

Xiaoliang Li; Hehe Liu

doi:10.1117/12.2671802

28 March 2023 Dynamics of an economic model of the electric power duopoly game

Xiaoliang Li, Hehe Liu

Proceedings Volume 12597, Second International Conference on Statistics, Applied Mathematics, and Computing Science (CSAMCS 2022); 1259712 (2023) https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2671802
Event: Second International Conference on Statistics, Applied Mathematics, and Computing Science (CSAMCS 2022), 2022, Nanjing, China

Abstract

In this paper, we explore an economic model of the electric power duopoly game, where firms are boundedly rational and adjust their outputs with a gradient mechanism. The equilibrium stability and dynamic behaviors like period and chaos are intensively studied. As symbolic rather than numerical methods are used in this paper, both of the procedures and the results of our computation are exact, wherein theoretical conclusions could be deduced.

Citation Download Citation

Xiaoliang Li and Hehe Liu "Dynamics of an economic model of the electric power duopoly game", Proc. SPIE 12597, Second International Conference on Statistics, Applied Mathematics, and Computing Science (CSAMCS 2022), 1259712 (28 March 2023); https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2671802

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